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Abstract: We estimate the gross margin that is earned from the supply of electricity to 
households in Ireland. Using half hourly electricity demand data, the system marginal price 
(also called the wholesale price) and the retail price of electricity, we analyse how the gross 
margin varies across customers with different characteristics. The wholesale price varies 
throughout the day, thus, the time at which electricity is used affects the gross margin. The 
main factor in determining gross margin, however, is demand.  
The highest gross margins are earned from supplying customers that have the following 
characteristics: being aged between 46 and 55, having a household income of at least 
€75,000 per annum, being self–employed, having a third level education, having a 
professional or managerial occupation, living in a household with 7 or more people, living in 
a detached house, having at least 5 bedrooms or being a mortgage holder.  
An OLS regression shows that gross margin is partly explained by the energy conservation 
measures which are present in a household, the number of household members, the 
number of bedrooms, income, age, occupation and accommodation type. 
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The Potential for Segmentation of the Retail Market for Electricity in 
Ireland 
1. Introduction 
Smart meters hold a lot of promise. Smart meters will enable demand side management for 
small electricity users through real time pricing and smart appliances. Smart meters will help 
with the integration into the electric power system of micro-generation and micro-storage, 
and of hybrid and all-electric vehicles. Smart meters will also yield unprecedented amounts 
of information about consumer behaviour. At present, the typical power company knows its 
clients’ monthly electricity use. In the future, power companies could know electricity use 
per minute – if so desired. 
In other markets, similar revolutions in data availability have led to market segmentation. 
This can be benign, as in the case of targeted promotions (e.g., supermarkets) or pricing 
(e.g., airlines) but in other cases regulators had to step in to prevent exclusion (e.g., health 
insurance). Because the wholesale price of electricity varies sharply over the diurnal cycle, 
high-frequency use data may turn out to be very valuable to power companies. Joskow and 
Tirole (2006) outline how competitive screening and adverse selection by electricity 
suppliers can arise in a situation where electricity consumers have real time meters installed 
and non-uniform pricing is prohibited. The authors note similarities with issues arising in the 
insurance markets as discussed by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). 
In this paper, we use data from the smart meter trial in Ireland to test whether profitability 
varies systematically between different types of households. Specificially, we estimate the 
gross margin earned from the supply of electricity. Using half hourly electricity demand data, 
the half hourly system marginal price (SMP) and the retail price of electricity, we analyse 
how the gross margin varies across customers, using their characteristics as revealed in a 
detailed user survey. We also run an OLS regression to establish which household 
characteristics are statistically significant in explaining gross margin. To the best of our 
knowledge, we are the first to do this for any country.  
In Ireland electricity is bought and sold through the All-Island electricity market which 
commenced operations in November 2007. The Single Electricity Market (SEM) operates on 
the basis of a mandatory pool market. All electricity generated on or imported onto the 
island of Ireland must be sold to this pool. In addition, all wholesale electricity for 
consumption on or export from the island of Ireland must be purchased from the pool 
market. Suppliers purchasing energy from the pool pay the generators the SMP, capacity 
costs1, and system charges. The SMP is a single island-wide price for each half hour trading 
period. It is determined via market scheduling and pricing software for each half hour 
trading period.  
                                                          
1  Capacity costs are payments to generators for making capacity available to the market. 
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There is a large literature in the marketing sphere that examines how businesses should 
identify and subsequently target their most profitable customers (see for example Kumar, 
Petersen and Leone, 2010, Lee and Park, 2005) This is important in the Irish electricity 
market where increased competition in recent years has encouraged many customers to 
switch providers. In such a market, businesses should realise that retaining customers is 
significantly less expensive than attracting new ones (Jeffrey and Franco, 1996, Reichheld 
and Sasser 1990). By identifying the gross margin across different groups of customers, 
electricity suppliers can more efficiently target, satisfy and retain their most profitable 
customers, thus increasing profits. The methods employed in this paper can be easily 
adopted for studies of gross margin in other countries where high-frequency household 
electricity demand data are available. 
The paper proceeds as follows: The data and methods used are described in the next 
section. The results are presented in Section 3. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Data and Methods 
We calculate the gross margin for electricity supplied to 4,232 households in every half hour 
period from the 14th of July to the 31st of December 2009. The gross margin of electricity 
supply to a particular customer at a particular day equals 
𝐺𝑖 = �(𝑃 −𝑊ℎ)𝐷𝑖,ℎ48
ℎ=1
 
where P is the retail price (in cent per kilowatt hour (kWh)), which is constant over time in 
Ireland; Wh is the wholesale price or SMP (in cent per kWh), which varies per half hour h; Di,h 
is the demand for electricity (in kWh) of customer i at time h; and Gi is the gross margin (in 
cents per day) of customer i. We find the total gross margin earned for each of these 4,232 
customers in the second half of 2009 and we then compare the gross margin of households 
with different characteristics. By dividing gross margin by total demand over the period we 
can analyse the average margin earned for different types of households. 
The Single Electricity Market Operator (SEMO) provides data on SMPs for every half hour 
trading period of 2009 (SEMO, 2010)2. The average SMP in 2009 was 3.5 cent/kWh. The 
retail price of electricity was 16.4 cent/kWh between January and April 2009. In May 2009 it 
decreased to 14.6 cent/kWh before falling to 14.1 cent/kWh in October 2009 (ESB Customer 
Supply, 2010). All households face the same retail prices. We use the standard 24 hour unit 
cost so that the retail price does not vary by time of day. We use data on half hourly 
household electricity demand in the second half of 2009 that was collected for the purpose 
of Smart Metering Customer Behaviour Trials (CER, 2011). The data provides demand data 
for the second half of 2009 (the benchmark period for the smart metering trials) and all of 
                                                          
2  Due to the absence of demand data from the Smart Metering trial prior to 14th July 2009, only SMP data after 
this date were needed for our analysis 
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2010 (the test period).  The benchmark period ran from the 1st of July to the 31st of 
December 2009; however data from the first two weeks of July were subsequently omitted 
from the final dataset due to incomplete data collection in this period (CER, 2011). We chose 
to analyse electricity use in 2009 because during the test period participants were put on 
various time-of-use tariffs and other demand side management stimuli were also used. 
Average electricity demand in our sample was 2115 kWh. More detailed descriptive statistics 
can be found in Table 1.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
The main factor driving gross margin is customer demand. Any changes in demand will result 
in changes in gross margin of the same proportion, ceteris paribus. Average electricity 
demand by time of day can be seen in Figure 1. The cost of supplying electricity varies with 
changes in aggregate demand in the residential sector. SMPs are highest between 18.30 and 
19.00 on both midweek and weekend days. An increase in the SMP has a negative effect on 
gross margin but because such an increase is associated with a period of higher demand in 
most households, the net effect on gross margin is positive. The average SMP by time of day 
in 2009 is displayed in Figure 2. 
Using the Smart Metering dataset we can analyse how the total gross margins and average 
margins vary across customers with different characteristics. The dataset provides 
information on household income and a range of socio-economic and household 
characteristics of respondents. The characteristics we include in this analysis are the 
respondents’ employment status, social status, age and gender. We also consider the 
education level of the household’s chief economic supporter (CES), the number of people in 
the household, the household’s income level, the type of accommodation, the number of 
bedrooms and type of tenure. The number of respondents in each category can be seen in 
Table 2.  
Having examined how gross margin varies across households with different characteristics, 
we run an OLS regression to establish which factors are most important in determining the 
gross margin. The model is specified as follows:  
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑥′𝑖𝛽 +  𝜖𝑖 
where 𝑦𝑖  is the gross margin earned from the supply of electricity to household i. 𝑥𝑖 is a 
vector of characteristics of household i and 𝛽 is a vector of parameters. 𝜖𝑖 specifies the error 
term. The explanatory variables comprise a range of respondent and household 
characteristics which we think might affect the gross margin. The respondent characteristics 
include age, gender, social class and employment status. We also include the education level 
of the CES. Many of these socio- economic characteristics were found to be statistically 
significant in studies of household energy demand (Leahy and Lyons, 2010, Druckman and 
Jackson, 2008 and O’Doherty et al., 2008).  
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The household characteristics include the type of accommodation because different 
accommodation types have very different patterns of electricity demand (Leahy and Lyons, 
2010, O’Doherty et al., 2008). We control for the number of bedrooms and the number of 
household members because these are positively associated with electricity demand (Leahy 
and Lyons, 2010). We also control for the number of household members that are at home 
during the day. As the SMP varies throughout the day, we expect that households that use 
electricity at the most expensive times will have lower gross margins. Another explanatory 
variable is the number of electrical appliances present in the accommodation. We also 
include the type of cooker present in the household. The year the accommodation was built 
proved significant in explaining household energy use and electricity demand in Ireland 
(Leahy and Lyons, 2010), thus we feel it may also play a role in explaining gross margin. The 
annual income earned by the household is also included as a control variable. Electricity 
demand increases with income so we expect income to be statistically significant in this 
model.  
The dataset provides information on a number of energy saving features present in the 
household which we include as dummy variables in our model. We expect that the gross 
margin earned from the supply of electricity to households that are concerned with energy 
conservation will be lower than that of other households. The variables we include are attic 
insulation, external wall insulation, lagging jacket and concern for the environment.   
 
3. Results 
3.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 shows the total gross margin earned across households with different characteristics 
in 2009. Table 2 also shows the average margin i.e.  gross margin divided by total electricity 
demand over the period.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
During the period analysed, the average gross margin is highest for respondents in the 46-55 
year old age group. A gross margin of €234 on average was earned from supplying each 
customer in this category in the second half of 2009. On the other hand, customers aged 
over 65 generated a margin of only €180 each over the same period. The average half hourly 
gross margin for the most elderly customers in our sample was 2.2 cent. In general, the 
relationship between gross margin and age is inverse-U-shaped. Gross margin increases with 
age until respondents reach the 46-55 year old category. Thereafter, gross margin decreases 
as respondents get older. This is consistent with the finding that electricity demand in 
Ireland decreases with age (Leahy and Lyons, 2010).  
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Because gross margin is so closely linked to demand, it is not surprising that gross margin is 
highest for the richest households in our sample. The highest gross margin is earned from 
supplying households that earn over €75,000 per annum. A margin of €247 can be earned 
from supplying each of these customers over the period analysed. This is €88 more than the 
margin earned from supplying the poorest households in our sample. We cannot say, 
however, that gross margin always increases with increases in income because those in the 
€50,000 - €75,000 category generate lower gross margins than respondents in the €30,000 - 
€50,000 category.  
Considering employment status, the self employed, especially those with employees, 
generate the highest gross margin. This could be because these customers work from home 
and thus demand more electricity than their counterparts who work outside the home. The 
self-employed may also be using electricity at times when the cost of supplying electricity is 
relatively low, thus boosting the gross margin. Retired customers generate the smallest 
margin. In one sense, this is surprising because retired people are more likely to be at home 
during the day, when SMPs are relatively high, compared to their younger counterparts who 
are out working. However, given that gross margin is smallest for customers aged over 65, 
this result is to be expected. With regard to electricity demand, Leahy and Lyons (2010) 
found that households whose CES is over 65 use significantly less electricity than households 
whose CES is younger. Leahy and Lyons (2010) also found that households in which the CES 
is retired use less electricity compared to households whose CES is in any other employment 
category.  
With regard to education levels, households whose CES is educated to third level generate 
higher gross margins than households whose CES has lower educational qualifications. Leahy 
and Lyons (2010) found that as education increases beyond second level, electricity demand 
increases but increases in third level qualifications result in decreases in electricity demand. 
This may be because the very well educated are more aware of the benefits of energy 
conservation. The Smart Metering Data does not specify different levels of post secondary 
education so we cannot tell if this inverse-U-shaped relationship exists for gross margin. The 
Smart Metering Data shows that education and income are positively correlated (0.37) and 
that the better educated and high income customers have a higher number of electrical 
appliances in their homes than their less well educated and poorer counterparts3. This helps 
explain the higher amounts of electricity demanded by these customers. Customers whose 
CES completed only primary education, generate the lowest gross margins. It is likely that 
these customers are also elderly ones because since 1972 it has been illegal to leave school 
before the age of 15 (See the School Attendance Act 1926 S.I. No. 105/1972).4 As stated 
previously, electricity demand decreases with age. 
                                                          
3  Households whose CES is educated to primary level have on average 22.8 appliances. For households whose 
CES is educated to third level the figure is 25.8. The poorest households have 22 appliances on average 
whereas the richest have 26.8.  
4  The Education and Welfare Act 2000 states that it is illegal to leave school before reaching the age of 16 or 
before completing 3 years of post primary education.   
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The gross margin also varies slightly by the gender of respondents. During the period 
analysed the households of the male respondents generate €9 extra  for electricity suppliers 
than their female counterparts; however, the standard deviation around the average is 
larger for males than it is for females. Customers in different social class categories also 
generate different gross margins. Customers who are employed in higher managerial, 
administrative or professional positions generate a margin of €243 whereas the figure is only 
€189 per year for customers who are either semi-skilled, unskilled, pensioners or 
unemployed. Those with a social status of higher managerial, administrative or professional 
are also the highest earners of all social status categories, so, this result is not surprising.  
As expected, the gross margin increases as the number of people living in a household 
increases. The smallest margins are made on one person households, generating just 2.1c 
per half hour. Two person households are more prevalent than any other household size but 
they generate a margin of just 2.3c per half hour. Ten person households generate the 
highest gross margin but there is just one such household in our sample. Generally, 
households with seven or more people generate the highest margins.  
Gross margins differ greatly across different types of accommodation. Customers living in 
apartments generate lower gross margins per half hour, and over the period of the analysis, 
compared to customers with any other characteristic considered in this study. Leahy and 
Lyons (2010) found that apartment dwellers demand lower amounts of electricity than those 
living in houses. This is probably because apartments are smaller and thus, easier to heat 
and they contain fewer electrical appliances due to space restrictions5. The biggest gross 
margins, in terms of accommodation types, can be earned on detached houses. Detached 
houses were also found to demand the most electricity by Leahy and Lyons (2010).  
Gross margin also differs with tenure. Electricity suppliers earn a higher margin from the 
supply of electricity to those renting from local authorities than they do from those renting 
privately. The difference is only about 0.25 cent per half hour or €21 over the period, 
however. Customers who are mortgage holders generate the highest margin in this 
category.  
As the number of bedrooms increases so too does the half hour gross margin earned by the 
electricity supplier. This is probably because homes with a large number of bedrooms 
probably have a larger total floor space. Thus, they may require more electricity for heating 
and lighting purposes and they may have more space for a large number of electrical 
appliances. 
While gross margins do vary across households with different characteristics, results show 
that the average margin is stable. The average margin is approximately 10 cent/kWh for 
each category of households considered in this analysis. This indicates that the time at which 
electricity is used does not lead to differences in the average margin earned from supplying 
different households. It is clear that almost all of the variation in gross margin is explained by 
changes in the level of demand. Figures 3A, 3B and 3C show how the pattern of electricity 
                                                          
5  Those living in apartments own 7 appliances whereas the average for the rest of the sample is 10. 
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demand varies with the age category of the respondent, the income level of the household 
and the employment status of the respondent. Although the level of demand is seen to vary 
across households, to our surprise, the pattern of demand is very similar. For this reason, the 
average margin is almost the same for all households. 
3.2. Regression results  
The results in Table 2 are univariate tabulations. This may be misleading: Income, age, and 
education are correlated. We therefore show the results of an OLS regression explaining 
gross margin in Table 3. We do not include household electricity demand as an explanatory 
variable because demand is used to compute the dependent variable. The variables that we 
do include in the model help explain approximately 43% of the variation in gross margin. 
Due to the large number of explanatory variables in the model, only the statistically 
significant results are discussed.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Results show that being aged between 26 and 35 is negatively associated with the gross 
margin. This is probably to do with different demand patterns exhibited by people of 
different age groups. Relatively younger respondents may not be at home as often or they 
may allocate time towards activities that do not require as much electricity as those 
activities pursued by their older counterparts. Interestingly, the coefficient for respondents 
aged over 65 is positive and significant. This contradicts the result displayed in Table 2 where 
we saw that the oldest respondents generate relatively low gross margins.6 This may be 
because elderly people use little electricity in absolute terms but a lot relative to their 
income and household size. 
Consistent with the result in Table 2 is the fact that the self-employed generate larger gross 
margins than their counterparts who are employees. As stated earlier, this may be due to 
increased electricity demand that may occur if one works from home, especially at times 
during the day when the SMP is relatively low. Only two of the social status variables are 
significant in the model: Being in the “Managerial, Administrative, Professional” category is 
positively associated with gross margin, which is consistent with the result in Table 2. Being 
a farmer is negatively associated with gross margin. This may be because farmers tend to 
spend more time outdoors and demand less electricity than those in other social classes. Or, 
it may be that rural households use power showers and electric cookers at peak hours.  
                                                          
6  The regression results refer only to those respondents who provided income data and not to the full sample. 
324 respondents who are over 65 provided income data. They must also be high users of electricity as they 
generate relatively high gross margins of €187 on average. There are 953 respondents aged over 65 in the full 
sample and their gross margin is slightly lower at €180 on average. 
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Only one category of annual household income is significant in the model.7 Having a 
household income level of between €30,000 and €50,000 is positively associated with the 
gross margin of the household. The bottom and top income categories are not significant in 
the model. It may be that households in the middle income category are not as concerned 
about electricity bills as the poorest households in our sample but it may also be that the 
middle income respondents spent more time at home, thus demanding more electricity, 
than the richest respondents in our sample.   
As expected, living in an apartment is negatively associated with gross margin. This is 
probably because apartments contain fewer rooms than other types of accommodation and, 
as a result, electricity demand is lower. Conversely, living in a detached home is positively 
associated with gross margin. Results also show that being a mortgage holder is positively 
associated with gross margin. Table 2 showed that the gross margin earned from supplying 
mortgage holders is higher than that earned from supplying respondents with different 
types of tenure.   
Living in accommodation with only one bedroom is significantly and positively associated 
with gross margin. This result is surprising for two reasons. First, it contradicts the results 
displayed in Table 2 which indicate that living in accommodation with one bedroom is 
negatively correlated with gross margin. Upon closer examination we see that only 17 
respondents who live in one bed-roomed accommodation provided income data and their 
gross margin is €139 on average. There are 46 respondents in total who live in one bed-
roomed accommodation. The gross margin for all of the respondents in this category is 
lower at €128 on average. Second, this result is surprising because one bed-roomed 
accommodation is likely to have a smaller floor space than accommodation comprising of 
more bedrooms. Thus, one would expect it to have a lower electricity requirement. It must 
be that respondents living in one bed-roomed accommodation use electricity for heating 
and cooking as opposed to other fuels such as natural gas which may be used in larger 
homes. The coefficients for accommodation with 4 bedrooms and at least 5 bedrooms are 
positive and significant. The higher space heating and lighting requirements associated with 
having more bedrooms may explain this result.  
Unsurprisingly, gross margin increases as the number of people living in the household 
increases. The number of electrical appliances present also proved statistically significant in 
explaining gross margin. The coefficient is positive indicating that as the number of 
appliances increases, so too does the gross margin.    
Some of the energy conservation variables proved significant in the model. Having a lagging 
jacket, attic insulation or external wall insulation are all negatively associated with gross 
margin. This may be because those households that have invested in these measures 
probably have lower electricity demand than households that are not concerned with 
energy conservation. This is an important result as it indicates that energy-saving measures 
                                                          
7  The Smart Metering dataset specifies these income categories so it is not possible to include income as a 
continuous variable.   
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are clearly not in electricity supply companies’ interests. This issue is discussed in Vine et al. 
(2003); the authors note that in competitive electricity markets it is in the interests of 
neither the wholesale nor the retail electricity supplier to encourage end-user energy 
conservation. In the case of the electricity suppliers, in order to maximise profits their 
objective will be to “maximize kWh sales” (Vine et al., 2009). 
Having a gas cooker is negatively associated with gross margin; this is as expected as the 
presence of a gas cooker is likely to lead to lower electricity consumption. Other types of 
cooker were insignificant which is unsurprising as very few people in the dataset had a 
cooker which was neither electric nor gas8. The education level of the CES and the year the 
accommodation was built were not important in explaining gross margin.  
 
4. Discussion and conclusion 
In this paper we estimate the gross margin that is earned from the supply of electricity to 
4,232 households in Ireland. Gross margin varies throughout the day with changes in 
customer demand and changes in the SMP. In a period of high demand gross margin 
increases even though the supply of electricity is more expensive at these times as indicated 
by higher SMPs.  
We compare the degree to which gross margin varies across customers with different 
characteristics. We find that the highest gross margins are earned from supplying customers 
that have the following characteristics: being aged between 46 and 55, having a household 
income of at least €75,000 per annum, being self-employed, having a third level education, 
having a professional or managerial occupation, living in a household with 7 or more people, 
living in a detached house, having at least 5 bedrooms or being a mortgage holder. 
The average margin is 10 cent/kWh for each group of households considered in this analysis. 
Upon further investigation we find that the pattern of electricity used does not differ greatly 
between households with different characteristics. Almost all of the variation in gross 
margin is explained by the level of demand rather than the time at which electricity is used.  
We run an OLS regression in order to establish which characteristics are important in 
explaining gross margin at the household level. Results show that gross margin is partly 
explained by the energy conservation measures which are present in a household, the 
number of household members, the number of bedrooms,  and the age, social status and 
occupation of household members. 
It is important that electricity providers identify the customers that generate the largest 
gross margins. In this way, suppliers can more efficiently target, satisfy and retain their most 
profitable customers. 
                                                          
8  Of the 1,946 people who provided income data only 47 had a oil fired cooker and only 33 had a solid fuel 
cooker 
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At the same time, competition is far from perfect in the electricity market and regulation is 
tight. Older and lower educated people are less likely to switch electricity provider 
(European Commission, 2009), so that less profitable clients may stay with the incumbent 
while more profitable ones join the new entrant. The new entrant would have a strong 
incentive to encourage that, say through selective advertising. However, electricity is seen as 
an essential good and there would be political pressure that the “vulnerable” (e.g., elderly, 
lower educated) would not pay “excessive” prices. In the current system, there is an implicit 
subsidy from the more profitable customers to the less profitable ones. In the future, this 
may become an explicit subsidy, or the regulator may take other action. At the moment, 
utilities are not allowed to charge higher prices, or refuse, rural clients, even though they 
can be expensive to connect. Similar restrictions may (have to) be imposed on otherwise 
unprofitable clients. 
In sum, smart meters will not just allow demand side management and integration of active 
clients. Smart meters will also allow market segmentation, and may require regulation to 
prevent adverse selection. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
     
SMP per half hour 0.046 0.054 0.017 0.562 
Electricity demand per half hour  0.522 0.737 0.000 8.318 
Total electricity demand  2114.769 1048.827 93.714 10623.630 
Gross margin per half hour  0.026 0.013 0.001 0.130 
Gross margin per household 211.920 105.137 9.242 1070.997 
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Table 2.  Total Gross Margin in 2009 
 Mean Std. Dev Min Max Gross Margin 
/Demand 
n 
 (€) (€) (€) (€) (€/kWh)  
Age of respondent       
Aged 18-25 197 105 56 453 0.1005 16 
Aged 26-35 204 98 20 689 0.1002 420 
Aged 36-45 232 106 10 955 0.1001 905 
Aged 46-55 234 111 11 1071 0.1002 1031 
Aged 56-65 203 103 14 723 0.1002 883 
Aged over 65 180 92 9 938 0.1003 953 
Not specified 224 133 33 536 0.1001 24 
Household income       
< €15,000 159 88 16 562 0.1003 185 
€15,000 - €30,000 198 100 15 697 0.1003 292 
€30,000 - €50,000 230 112 13 955 0.1002 463 
€50,000 - €75,000 218 101 9 549 0.1002 634 
> €75,000 247 109 19 689 0.1002 372 
Employment Status       
Employee 222 102 10 787 0.1002 2001 
Self-employed with employees 279 154 33 1071 0.1001 232 
Self-employed without employees 237 109 11 697 0.1001 303 
Unemployed seeking work 201 102 27 635 0.1000 200 
Unemployed not seeking work 194 97 25 533 0.1000 170 
Retired 181 88 9 840 0.1003 1285 
Carer 231 98 44 477 0.1001 41 
Education level of CES       
No formal education 192 91 37 398 0.1001 59 
Primary education 178 96 16 840 0.1003 475 
Junior Certificate 212 100 9 635 0.1002 712 
Leaving Certificate 210 102 11 955 0.1002 1174 
Third level  224 110 10 1071 0.1002 1580 
Not specified 212 109 10 723 0.1001 232 
 
Social Status 
      
AB: Managerial, administrative, 
professional 243 124 19 1071 0.1002 642 
C1: Supervisory or clerical, junior 
managerial, administrative or 
professional 222 108 10 787 0.1002 1134 
C2: Skilled manual workers 219 95 10 491 0.1002 706 
DE: Semi and unskilled manual 
workers, casual workers, those in 
receipt of state benefits 189 93 13 840 0.1002 1593 
F: Farmers 205 128 9 674 0.1001 113 
Not specified 210 94 44 465 0.1003 44 
Gender of respondent       
Male 216 107 9 955 0.1002 2127 
Female 207 103 10 1071 0.1002 2105 
Household Size       
 15 
 Mean Std. Dev Min Max Gross Margin 
/Demand 
n 
1 person household 173 89 42 549 0.1004 51 
2 person household 190 86 9 938 0.1003 1340 
3 person household 227 82 13 601 0.1002 740 
4 person household 261 99 10 1071 0.1001 751 
5 person household 304 106 14 787 0.1001 361 
6 person household 319 106 14 694 0.1000 140 
7 person household 327 92 177 689 0.1001 29 
8 person household 328 89 210 468 0.1000 7 
9 person household 338 98 269 408 0.1004 2 
10 person household 439 . 439 439 0.1000 1 
12 person household 286 256 105 467 0.1018 2 
Not specified 125 72 10 955 0.1003 808 
Accommodation Type       
Apartment 112 55 37 284 0.1002 72 
Semi-detached 198 95 10 938 0.1002 1351 
Detached 241 115 10 1071 0.1002 1121 
Terraced 181 94 20 662 0.1002 613 
Bungalow 223 104 9 955 0.1003 1068 
Not specified 196 93 33 288 0.1004 7 
Tenure       
Renting Privately 161 92 22 472 0.1003 71 
Renting from local authority 182 89 27 453 0.1000 228 
Owned outright 201 101 9 955 0.1002 2215 
Mortgage holder 232 110 10 1071 0.1002 1706 
Other tenure 197 94 67 373 0.1002 12 
Number of bedrooms       
1 bedroom 128 110 27 697 0.1002 46 
2 bedrooms 135 76 10 451 0.1002 358 
3 bedrooms 187 88 9 840 0.1002 1884 
4 bedrooms 240 98 13 955 0.1002 1470 
At least 5 bedrooms 293 128 19 1071 0.1002 465 
Not specified 245 108 33 400 0.1006 9 
       
* Only 1946 respondents provided income data. 
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Table 3. OLS regression results: Gross margin 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. 
Age of respondent   
Aged 18-25 23.247 31.548 
Aged 26-35 -13.412 6.772** 
Aged 36-45 -3.894 5.376 
Aged 46-55 (ref)   
Aged 56-65 6.262 6.491 
Aged over 65 21.799 9.535** 
Household income   
< €15,000 9.968 8.413 
€15,000 - €30,000 8.449 6.347 
€30,000 - €50,000 8.339 5.034* 
€50,000 - €75,000 (ref)   
> €75,000 3.669 5.608 
Employment Status   
Employee (ref)   
Self-employed with employees 29.417 8.129*** 
Self-employed without employees 15.305 7.561** 
Unemployed seeking work -1.853 12.415 
Unemployed not seeking work 12.685 14.846 
Retired 1.733 8.818 
Carer 35.131 25.618 
Education level of CES   
No formal education 11.762 18.926 
Primary education -5.070 8.468 
Junior Certificate -4.734 6.201 
Leaving Certificate 0.164 4.686 
Third level (ref)   
Social Status   
AB: Managerial, administrative, professional 14.664 7.464** 
C1: Supervisory or clerical, junior managerial, 
administrative or professional 5.298 6.622 
C2: Skilled manual workers                                                   6.677 7.119 
DE: Semi and unskilled manual workers, casual 
workers, those in receipt of state benefits (ref) 
  
F: Farmers -24.317 13.449* 
Gender of respondent   
Male (ref)   
Female 1.835 3.941 
Accommodation Type   
Apartment -27.715 15.942* 
Semi-detached (ref)   
Detached 12.146 5.245** 
Terraced -9.092 6.431 
Not specified 11.326 5.342** 
Tenure   
Renting Privately -20.304 16.109 
Renting from local authority 3.811 12.349 
Owned outright (ref)   
Mortgage holder 8.270 4.694* 
Other tenure 91.828 82.316 
 
Number of bedrooms 
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Variable Coefficient Std. Err. 
1 bedroom 45.245 21.659** 
2 bedrooms -4.657 8.134 
3 bedrooms (ref)   
4 bedrooms 13.253 4.695*** 
At least 5 bedrooms 40.812 7.057*** 
Type of Coker   
Electric Cooker (ref)   
Gas cooker -8.703 4.503* 
Oil fired cooker 1.552 12.353 
Solid fuel cooker -5.217 14.881 
Number of electrical appliances 8.596 0.726*** 
Continuous Variables   
Year accommodation was built -0.001 0.001 
Number of household members 24.626 1.541*** 
Number of household members at home during 
the day -0.669 0.509 
Energy Conservation dummy variables  
External wall insulation -9.960 4.205** 
Attic insulation -8.089 3.999** 
Lagging jacket -10.530 5.224** 
Concerned about the environment -5.145 7.451 
Constant -75.705 21.806*** 
   
Number of observations 1942  
Prob > F (47, 1894) 0.0000  
R-squared 0.4306  
Adj R-squared  0.4165  
Root MSE 81.36  
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Figure 1. Average household electricity demand by time of day in 2009 
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Figure 2. Average SMP by time of day in 2009 
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Figure 3A. Electricity profile by age group of respondent 
 
 
Figure 3B. Electricity profile by annual household income 
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Figure 3C. Electricity profile by employment status of respondent 
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